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Fundamental to any theory of capital taxation is a description of individual savings be-
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ect, a complementarity eect, and a future incentive eect. Second, we provide
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mulation of constrained ecient allocations and evaluate the quantitative impact of habit
formation. In a model parameterized to the U.S. economy, habit formation reduces average
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1 Introduction
Fundamental to any theory of capital taxation is a description of individual savings behavior.
Successful descriptions of savings behavior have often resorted to the habit formation hypothesis.
This hypothesis states that consumption is complementary across time|consuming a lot today
makes individuals hungrier for consumption tomorrow. Habit formation has reconciled theory
and evidence for several important aspects of savings behavior, such as the equity premium
puzzle, the relationship between savings and growth, wealth inequality, or reactions to monetary
policy shocks.1 Despite the success of habit formation in explaining savings decisions under
uncertainty, the implications for the optimal taxation of capital are unknown. The present paper
aims to ll this gap. We motivate capital taxation in the tradition of Diamond and Mirrlees
(1978) and the recent literature on `New Dynamic Public Finance' (surveyed by Kocherlakota,
2010). Private information, in combination with uncertainty, implies that the accumulation of
assets today aects the incentive to supply labor in the future. Capital taxes serve to correct
this externality.
Our paper makes three contributions. First, we provide a decomposition of intertemporal
wedges (implicit capital taxes) for general time-nonseparable preferences into a standard wealth
eect, a complementarity eect, and a future incentive eect (Proposition 1). Second, we derive
theoretical conditions under which intertemporal wedges are positive (Proposition 2). Finally,
we extend the recursive contracting approach to habit formation economies and evaluate the
quantitative importance of habit formation for intertemporal wedges. For a model parameter-
ized to the U.S. economy, average capital tax rates decrease by about 40 percent compared to
the case of time-separable preferences. Moreover, capital tax rates are close to zero except at
the very end of the working life.
Our model is a standard dynamic Mirrlees model of optimal taxation generalized to the
case of time-nonseparable preferences. Agents face dynamic shocks to their abilities to generate
labor income. Labor income is publicly observed, but abilities and labor supply are private
information. The only restrictions imposed on life-time consumption utility are monotonicity
and concavity. In addition to habit formation, this setup allows for alternative forms of time-
1Abel (1990), Constantinides (1990), and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) study asset pricing under habit
formation, Ryder and Heal (1973) and Carroll, Overland, and Weil (2000) explore habit formation in a growth
model, Diaz, Pijoan-Mas, and Rios-Rull (2003) analyze precautionary savings and wealth inequality, Fuhrer
(2000) studies reactions to monetary policy. Messinis (1999) provides a review of the literature.
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nonseparability, including models where the consumption good is durable. In this environment,
we characterize the solution of the social planning problem in terms of intertemporal wedges. As
common in this literature, positive intertemporal wedges represent implicit taxes on capital and
indicate that decentralizations of the social planning allocation must correct individual capital
returns downward in one way or another.2
By decomposing intertemporal wedges, we show that optimal capital taxes for habit forma-
tion preferences are determined by three forces. First of all, saving should be taxed because
the agent has a better incentive to supply labor in the next period if he starts the next period
with lower wealth (wealth eect). This force is well-known from the standard time-separable
model. Second, saving should be taxed, because enhancing present consumption due to habit
formation makes high consumption in the next period more attractive, which reinforces next
period's labor supply incentives (complementarity eect). Finally, saving should be subsidized,
because boosting next period's consumption due to habit formation improves labor supply in-
centives in the remaining periods (future incentive eect). Habit formation thus changes the
capital taxation motive in countervailing ways, and its impact will depend on the relative mag-
nitude of the last two components. If consumption is substitutable rather than complementary
across time (as in models with durable consumption), the signs of the complementarity eect
and the future incentive eect are reversed. In both cases, the impact of time-nonseparability
on optimal capital taxes is theoretically ambiguous.
We then study how far the perturbation approach of Rogerson (1985) can be extended to
identify the sign of intertemporal wedges for time-nonseparable preferences. We show that
intertemporal wedges are positive at the very end of the working life for very general models of
time-nonseparable preferences, including standard formulations of habit formation and durable
consumption. Technically, our nding replaces the well-known Jensen's inequality argument by
a more general result on the positivity of the covariance of two monotonic functions. For earlier
periods, the perturbation approach becomes infeasible, however.3
The quantitative part of the paper evaluates the impact of habit formation on intertemporal
wedges in a model parameterized to the U.S. economy. To the best of our knowledge, this is
2The decentralization of optimal allocations is not unique; see Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003),
Kocherlakota (2005), Albanesi and Sleet (2006), Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006), Werning (2011), Gottardi and
Pavoni (2011), Abraham, Koehne, and Pavoni (2012), among others.
3For the same reason, the Inverse Euler equation does not generalize to the time-nonseparable case; see
Grochulski and Kocherlakota (2010).
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the rst quantitative analysis of optimal dynamic taxes in a habit formation environment. As a
methodological contribution, we extend the recursive contracting approach and show that stan-
dard formulations of habit formation can be dealt with by adding one additional state variable
to the planner's recursive problem. We nd that habit formation has a signicantly negative
eect on intertemporal wedges. Compared to the time-separable case, average intertemporal
wedges drop by about 40 percent. The eect is even stronger if we exclude the very end of the
working life. For more than the rst three quarters of the working life, intertemporal wedges
are virtually zero.
Habit formation reduces intertemporal wedges, because the negative future incentive eect
more than outweighs the positive complementarity eect. Intuitively, habit formation creates a
link between present consumption-saving decisions and future incentive problems. Encouraging
consumption in any period increases future habit levels and thereby raises the agent's marginal
utility in the future. This has a positive eect on labor supply incentives. The negative future
incentive eect arises because future habit levels respond more strongly to next period's con-
sumption than to present consumption. This creates a motive for subsidizing saving in order to
increase next period's consumption and thereby relax future incentive problems. Since incentive
problems aggravate over time (incentives rely more on costly immediate consumption rewards
and less on future promises), the future incentive eect creates a strong force for saving subsi-
dies with habit formation preferences. This force is nearly as big as the motive to tax saving
in order to relax the incentive problem in the immediately following period. As a consequence,
intertemporal wedges are close to zero over much of the working life. They become positive
only close to retirement when the future incentive eect vanishes.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the related literature. Section 3
sets up our general theoretical model. Section 4 decomposes intertemporal wedges into three
parts. By means of two stylized examples, we show that nonpositive intertemporal wedges can
emerge both from intertemporal complementarity as well as from intertemporal substitutability
of consumption. We then provide sucient conditions for intertemporal wedges to be positive.
Section 5 studies the quantitative importance of habit formation for intertemporal wedges, while
Section 6 concludes.
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2 Related literature
With very few exceptions, most existing studies of dynamic taxation problems work with time-
separable preferences for simplicity and tractability. The contribution closest to ours is by
Grochulski and Kocherlakota (2010), who explore a taxation framework with general time-
nonseparable preferences similar to the present paper. They show that social security systems
(with history-dependent taxes and transfers upon retirement) can be used to decentralize opti-
mal allocations when preferences are time-nonseparable. Regarding intertemporal wedges, they
construct an insightful example of a 3-period habit formation model with private information
only in the nal period and show that the intertemporal wedge in the initial period is negative.
Our decomposition shows that the future incentive eect is responsible for this result. However,
we also reveal that incentive problems in the immediate future create countervailing forces due
to the wealth and the complementarity eect. Our quantitative analysis therefore nds that,
even though it is possible to construct theoretical cases where wedges are negative, those cases
are not representative of typical taxation environments.
Farhi andWerning (2008) analyze optimal savings distortions for a class of time-nonseparable
and state-nonseparable recursive preferences. There are at least three main dierences between
their contribution and the present one. First, dierent from standard models of habit forma-
tion, the preferences explored by Farhi and Werning (2008) do not have an expected utility
representation. Second, proportional variations of consumption do not aect the incentives to
supply labor in their model. This feature allows disentangling the roles of risk aversion and
intertemporal substitution, but it abstracts from a number of eects that determine optimal
allocations for alternative cases of time-nonseparability. In particular, forces calling for negative
intertemporal wedges are absent in their environment. Finally, our quantitative exercise studies
constrained ecient allocations, while Farhi and Werning (2008) explore partial and general
equilibrium eects of a reform that distorts the consumption prole, but not labor supply.
The present paper is also related to the dynamic contracting literature on eort persis-
tence, which studies private information problems with a production technology that is time-
nonseparable; see Mukoyama and Sahin (2005), Kwon (2006), Jarque (2010), and Hopenhayn
and Jarque (2010). In contrast to the present model, the Inverse Euler equation remains valid
in that framework. Hence, time-nonseparable technologies and time-nonseparable preferences
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change optimal allocations in fundamentally dierent ways.
Finally, the paper builds on the extensive literature on time-nonseparable preferences. This
literature has evolved around two main concepts. First of all, there is the hypothesis of habit
formation. This concept goes back to the theory of adaptation formalized in the psychological
literature by Helson (1964). Habit formation postulates that individuals compare their current
consumption to a historical reference level, and derive utility both from consumption per se and
from consumption growth. Frederick and Loewenstein (1999) review the substantial body of
empirical research supporting this hypothesis. For instance, workers' self-reported well-being is
often closely related to recent changes in pay, but not so much to absolute levels of pay (Clark,
1999). Ravina (2007) nds strong support for habit formation based on micro level consumption
data. For a review of habit formation in the macroeconomic literature see Messinis (1999).
Complementary to the habit formation literature, a second line of research focuses on short-
run substitution eects typically referred to as local substitution. Using high frequency aggregate
data on consumption and asset prices, Dunn and Singleton (1986), Eichenbaum and Hansen
(1990), and Heaton (1993, 1995) nd evidence that consumption is substitutable over short
periods of time (weeks, months, quarters). These ndings can be micro founded by assuming
that consumption goods are partly durable and subject to adjustment costs. The theoretical
framework in the present paper is exible enough to allow for both habit formation and local
substitution eects.
3 A dynamic taxation model with time-nonseparable prefer-
ences
This section sets up a dynamic Mirrleesian model of optimal taxation with time-nonseparable
preferences. The notation largely follows Grochulski and Kocherlakota (2010).
The economy consists of a risk-neutral principal/planner and a unit measure of risk-averse
agents facing dynamic skill shocks. The planner observes the output of each agent in every
period, but does not observe hours (labor input) and skill levels. Time is discrete and indexed
by t = 1; 2; : : : ; T , with T 2 N [ f1g.
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3.1 Preferences
To focus on time-nonseparability, we consider preferences that are additively separable between
consumption and labor.4 The agents have identical von-Neumann-Morgenstern preferences and
maximize the expected value of
U(c1; : : : ; cT )  V (l1; : : : ; lT ) (1)
where ct 2 R+ denotes consumption and lt 2 R+ represents hours worked at date t, t = 1; : : : ; T .
Labor disutility V (l1; : : : ; lT ) is increasing in each argument and weakly convex. Consumption
utility U(c1; : : : ; cT ) is twice continuously dierentiable, increasing in each argument and con-
cave. As usual, we use subscripts to denote partial derivatives.
Notice that this setup allows for consumption complementarities across time, Uct;cs > 0 for
t 6= s (as in models of habit formation), as well as consumption substitutabilities Uct;cs < 0 for
t 6= s (as in models of durable consumption), and combinations thereof. The setup also includes
the time-separable case, Uct;cs = 0 for t 6= s, of course.5
3.2 Skills
Agents dier with respect to their skills. An agent with hours lt and skill t generates yt = tlt
units of output in period t. Output is publicly observable, but hours and skill are private
information.
At time zero, a skill path T = (1; : : : ; T ) is drawn for each agent. Paths are drawn
independently across agents according to a probability measure  on the set T :=   ,
where  is a nite subset of the positive reals. Denote the expectation operator with respect to 
by E[  ]. At the beginning of period t, every agent learns his current skill t. The information of
a given agent in period t is thus his individual history t = (1; : : : ; t). As usual, the notation
Et[  ] := E[  jt] represents expectations conditional on that history. Similarly, conditional
covariances are denoted by covt(  ;  ).
4Nonseparable preferences between consumption and labor are explored by Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werning
(2006).
5Besides, the model allows for time-nonseparabilities in the preferences over hours, but this will be irrelevant
for the questions addressed in this paper. As usual in this literature, our results emerge from the analysis of the
consumption allocation that optimally implements a given labor plan. For this question, time-nonseparabilities
in V play no role. The details of V become important, however, if one wants to understand the dynamics of
optimal labor plans.
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3.3 Technology
The planner has access to a linear technology for intertemporal transfers which allows to trans-
form x 2 R units of date-t output into Rtx units of output at date t + 1. The gross rate of
return is deterministic and nonnegative: Rt > 0 for all t. It would not be dicult to endogenize
the rate of return by introducing an explicit production function that depends on capital and
labor. Yet, this would only complicate the notation and generate no new insights. We therefore
follow Grochulski and Kocherlakota (2010) and let the rate of return be exogenous.
3.4 Allocations
An allocation is a sequence (c;y) = (ct; yt)t=1;:::;T of consumption plans ct : 
T ! R+ and
output plans yt : 
T ! R+ such that, for any period t, ct and yt are functions of period-t
information. That is, ct and yt are 
t-measurable.
At the beginning of every period, the planner assigns consumption and output to each agent
according to the agent's skill report. A reporting strategy is a mapping  : T ! T such that
the period-t component t is 
t-measurable for all t. Denote the truth-telling strategy by ,
with (T ) = T for all T , and denote the set of all reporting strategies by  . Since skills are
privately observed, the planner must ensure that all agents reveal their information truthfully.
Hence, allocations must satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint
E

U(c1(
); : : : ; cT ())  V

y1(
)
1
; : : : ;
yT (
)
T

 E

U(c1(); : : : ; cT ())  V

y1()
1
; : : : ;
yT ()
T

:
(2)
An allocation that satises (2) for all reporting strategies  2  is called incentive compatible.
3.5 Optimal allocations
The social planner seeks to provide a given level U1 of ex-ante welfare at minimal costs. Hence,
an allocation (c;y) is called optimal if it minimizes costs
min
c;y
E
"
TX
t=1
ct   yt
R1   Rt 1
#
(3)
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subject to the constraints that (c;y) is incentive compatible and generates welfare U1,
E

U(c1; : : : ; cT )  V

y1
1
; : : : ;
yT
T

= U1: (4)
4 Theoretical analysis of intertemporal wedges
As is well known in the dynamic public nance literature, the decentralization of optimal alloca-
tions is not unique. Hence, the robust insights from the present analysis are not about explicit
tax instruments, but about optimal tax distortions or wedges. We show that intertemporal
wedges (implicit capital taxes) for time-nonseparable preferences consist of three, not necessar-
ily positive, components. We then provide conditions under which intertemporal wedges are
positive.
It is helpful to formalize some concepts. As usual, the shadow rate of return (between
periods t and t + 1) of a given consumption allocation
 
c1(
1); : : : ; cT (
T )

is dened as the
interest rate at which the agent is indierent between saving and not saving. Formally, the
shadow rate of return is
Et[Uct(c1; : : : ; cT )]
Et[Uct+1(c1; : : : ; cT )]
: (5)
We are interested in the dierence between the technological rate of intertemporal transforma-
tion Rt and the agent's shadow rate of return. It is convenient to write this dierence in relative
terms and dene the intertemporal wedge between periods t and t+ 1 as
Kt := 1 
Et[Uct(c1; : : : ; cT )]
RtEt[Uct+1(c1; : : : ; cT )]
: (6)
Note that Kt is a random variable that depends on the date-t history 
t as indicated by the
conditional expectations operator Et[  ]. If the intertemporal wedge Kt is positive, then the
marginal rate of transformation Rt exceeds the individual shadow rate of return, and the allo-
cation features an implicit tax on capital. If Kt is negative, we have an implicit subsidy.
4.1 Decomposition of intertemporal wedges
The following result shows that intertemporal wedges for time-nonseparable preferences have
three components. For the proof of Proposition 1 and all further proofs see Appendix A.
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Proposition 1 (Decomposition). Let (c;y) be an optimal allocation. For any t 2 f1; : : : ; T 1g,
the intertemporal wedge equals Kt = t (At +Bt + Ct), where t is positive and where
At =  covt

RtUct+1 ;
1
Uct+1

 0; (7)
Bt = covt

Uct ;
1
Uct+1

R 0; (8)
Ct = Rt   Et

Uct
Uct+1

R 0: (9)
Intuitively, an intertemporal wedge emerges whenever saving has social eects that are not
internalized by the agent. The wedge captures the distortion to the agent's savings margin
necessary to align it with the social savings margin. In the present model, the wedge arises
because the agent does not internalize the impact of saving on the incentive problem.
Consider the following hypothetical situation: the agent, after working in period t and
receiving the transfer ct(
t), saves one unit of consumption at gross return Rt. Then three eects
change the agent's preferences over future states, and thereby the incentive to supply labor (or,
put dierently, the incentive to report truthfully) in the future. Each eect is associated with
one component identied in Proposition 1.
First of all, there is the standard wealth eect. Saving one consumption unit at time t yields
Rt extra consumption units at time t + 1, which raises the agent's utility by RtUct+1 . This
expression varies negatively with the realization of ct+1, which means that states with low ct+1
become relatively more attractive, and thus the agent's incentive to supply labor in period t+1
is reduced. The term
At =  covt

RtUct+1 ;
1
Uct+1

(10)
captures this eect. The rst variable, RtUct+1 , expresses the utility gain of Rt extra con-
sumption units at t + 1. The second variable, 1=Uct+1 , is a monotonic function of ct+1, so the
covariance is nonpositive and hence At is nonnegative. Moreover, it is easy to see that At is
positive unless ct+1 is constant almost everywhere. Finally, note that the eect picked up by
At is unrelated to potential time-nonseparabilites of preferences. The term At thus captures
the component of the intertemporal wedge that is well-known from models with time-separable
preferences.
The second component of the intertemporal wedge is the complementarity eect. Saving in
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period t reduces the agent's consumption in period t and thereby diminishes the agent's utility
by Uct . This changes the relative preference over states at time t + 1 depending on whether
consumption is complementary or substitutable over time. When consumption is complemen-
tary over time (as in habit formation models), the cross-derivative of U with respect to ct and
ct+1 is positive, which implies that the term
Bt = covt

Uct ;
1
Uct+1

(11)
contributes positively to the intertemporal wedge. Intuitively, reducing consumption in period
t increases the relative attractiveness of low consumption in period t + 1. This goes in the
same direction as the wealth eect and generates an additional motive for taxing savings.
When consumption is substitutable across time (as in models with durable consumption), the
previous argument is reversed and the term Bt becomes negative, because the substitutability
of consumption leads to a benecial eect of saving on the incentive problem; see Example 1
below.
Finally, the intertemporal wedge has the component
Ct = Rt

1  Et

Uct
RtUct+1

: (12)
This term is a residual that picks up all reasons for distorting the savings margin that are not
covered by the two previous components. The formula itself is hard to interpret, but we note
that the Inverse Euler equation (Rogerson, 1985) implies that Ct equals zero for time-separable
preferences.6 More generally, we have the following result.
Lemma 1. Let (c;y) be an optimal allocation. Suppose that, for some t 2 f1; : : : ; T   1g,
marginal utilities Uct(c1; : : : ; cT ) and Uct+1(c1; : : : ; cT ) are 
t+1-measurable. Then Ct = 0 almost
everywhere.
Lemma 1 implies that Ct equals zero if there is full insurance in periods t + 2; : : : ; T or if
preferences in periods t+ 2; : : : ; T do not depend on ct and ct+1. In particular, Ct equals zero
in the penultimate period. When Ct diers from zero, it captures a distortion to the agent's
6If U(c1; : : : ; cT ) =
P
t 
t 1u(ct), we can write Ct = u0(ct)Rt (1=u0(ct)  Et [1=(Rtu0(ct+1))]). The term in
parentheses is equal to zero by the Inverse Euler equation from Rogerson (1985).
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savings margin motivated by future incentive eects. Intuitively, by distorting the decision
between ct and ct+1, the planner manipulates preferences in periods t+ 2 and later in order to
relax the incentive problem at those dates.
It is dicult to determine the sign of the future incentive eect analytically, given that the
existence of this eect invalidates the perturbation approach proposed by Rogerson (1985).7
Yet, the idea underlying the eect is simple. When consumption is complementary between
dates t + 1 and t + 2, then a high level of consumption at t + 1 makes high consumption at
t+ 2 relatively more attractive. This helps with the incentive problem at t+ 2 and generates a
motive for subsidizing saving at t as in Example 2 below. Similar motives arise if consumption
at date t+ 1 is complementary with consumption at other future dates.8 The future incentive
eect therefore provides a rationale for subsidizing saving in cases with consumption comple-
mentarities (as in habit formation models) and counteracts the positive complementarity eect.
With consumption substitutability (as in models with durable consumption), the signs of both
eects are reversed. In both cases, the overall eect arising from time-nonseparability remains
ambiguous.
We now present two simple examples that highlight the roles of the complementarity eect
and the future incentive eect, respectively. Moreover, we show that both eects can lead to
nonpositive intertemporal wedges.
Example 1 (Intertemporal substitutability). Let T = 2. In the rst period, the agent's skill 1
is deterministic. In the second period, the skill is distributed in the set fL; Hg, where L and
H > L both have nonzero probability. Allocations take the form (c1; c2i; y1; y2i)i=L;H , where
the index i 2 fL;Hg refers to the agent's skill type in the second period. To make the problem
nontrivial, we assume y2H > y2L.
Suppose that the principal can save and borrow at an interest rate of zero, i.e., R = 1. More-
over, suppose for a moment that the agent's preferences over consumption are time-separable,
i.e., U(c1; c2) = u(c1) + u(c2), where u is increasing and concave. Then, using the well-known
result from Rogerson (1985), at any optimal allocation the agent remains with a residual motive
7For the same reason, the Inverse Euler equation does not generalize to the time-nonseparable case; see
Grochulski and Kocherlakota (2010).
8Our simple reasoning abstracts from potential complementarities between date t and dates t+ 2; : : : ; T , but
since the degree of complementarity typically diminishes over time, consumption at date t+ 1 tends to be more
crucial for future incentives.
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to save:
E[Uc1(c1; c2i)]
E[Uc2(c1; c2i)]
=
u0(c1)
E[u0(c2i)]
< 1: (13)
Now consider the following case of time-nonseparable preferences: U(c1; c2) = u(c1 + c2),
where u is increasing and concave. Since the cross derivative of U is negative, consumption is
substitutable over time. It is straightforward that at any (not necessarily optimal) allocation,
we have the following identity:
E[Uc1(c1; c2i)]
E[Uc2(c1; c2i)]
=
E[u0(c1 + c2i)]
E[u0(c1 + c2i)]
= 1: (14)
Hence, in contrast to the time-separable case, the agent has no residual motive to save/borrow
at an optimal allocation, and the intertemporal wedge is zero: K1 = A1 + B1 + C1 = 0: Note
that the identity Uc1 = Uc2 implies C1 = 0. Hence, the future incentive eect is absent in
this example. The intertemporal wedge consists of a positive wealth eect A1 and a negative
complementarity eect B1, which exactly oset each other.
To see why the wealth eect and the complementarity eect are equally large in this example,
note that a marginal increase in second period wealth increases the agent's utility by Uc2(c1; c2).
A marginal reduction of rst period consumption reduces the agent's utility by Uc1(c1; c2). The
total eect of saving is thus Uc2(c1; c2)   Uc1(c1; c2) = 0, which is independent of c2. As a
consequence, distorting the agent's savings margin does not aect the incentive problem and
the intertemporal wedge is zero.
Example 2 (Intertemporal complementarity / habit formation). The following example is
taken from Grochulski and Kocherlakota (2010).
Modify the setup from Example 1 by adding an initial period indexed with t = 0 and
consider consumption preferences of the form
U(c0; c1; c2) = u(c0) + u(c1) + u(c2   c1); (15)
where u is an increasing, concave function. In the nal period, the agent does not derive utility
from consumption per se, but from consumption relative to the reference level c1. Intuitively,
the agent develops a consumption habit in this case. Since the cross derivative Uc1;c2 is positive,
consumption is complementary between dates 1 and 2.
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As in the previous example, skills are stochastic only in the nal period. Allocations thus
take the form (c0; c1; c2i; y0; y1; y2i)i=L;H . Grochulski and Kocherlakota (2010) show that, under
the condition y2H > y2L, any optimal allocation satises
E[Uc0(c0; c1; c2i)]
E[Uc1(c0; c1; c2i)]
=
u0(c0)
u0(c1)  E[u0(c2i   c1)] > 1; (16)
which means that the agent is left with a residual motive to borrow at date t = 0. In other
words, the intertemporal wedge between periods 0 and 1 is negative: K0 < 0. Our decomposition
reveals that a negative future incentive eect is responsible for this result. Since there is no
uncertainty in the rst two periods, both A0 and B0 are equal to zero, and thus C0 = 
K
0 < 0.
Intuitively, subsidizing the agent's savings margin here helps the principal with the incen-
tive problem in period 2. Notice that saving in period 0 makes the agent richer in period 1,
which due to consumption complementarity increases the agent's marginal utility in period 2.
Consequently, saving between periods 0 and 1 has a socially desirable eect on labor supply
incentives in period 2 (and no eect on incentives in period 1 as private information is absent
then). Since the agent does not internalize that eect, optimal allocations feature a negative
intertemporal wedge in order to subsidize the agent's savings activity.
4.2 Sucient conditions for positive intertemporal wedges
Since intertemporal wedges for time-nonseparable preferences consist of three partly opposing
components, it is dicult to determine the sign of intertemporal wedges for general specications
of time-nonseparability. Some results can be obtained by extending the techniques that are
familiar from time-separable models. However, this requires relatively strong assumptions as
the next nding shows.
Proposition 2 (Positive intertemporal wedge). Let (c;y) be an optimal allocation and t 2
f1; : : : ; T   1g. Suppose that marginal utilities Uct(c1; : : : ; cT ) and Uct+1(c1; : : : ; cT ) are t+1-
measurable and that the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution Uct+1=Uct is a decreasing
function of ct+1. Then 
K
t  0 almost everywhere. Moreover, Kt > 0 except when the associated
history t has probability zero or when ct+1(
t; t+1) is constant for almost all t+1. By contrast,
the last two inequalities are reversed when Uct+1=Uct is an increasing function of ct+1.
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Under the assumptions of Proposition 2, optimal allocations impose implicit taxes on cap-
ital (positive intertemporal wedges) if the agent's marginal rate of intertemporal substitution,
Uct+1=Uct , is decreasing in consumption at date t + 1. This condition seems hardly restrictive
as it states that the agent's value of having one extra consumption unit at time t + 1 relative
to time t falls with the level of consumption at time t + 1. Since time-separable preferences
satisfy this property, our result contains the nding that intertemporal wedges are positive
for time-separable preferences (Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski, 2003) as a special case.
Proposition 2 is based on the insight that consumption substitutabilities between periods t and
t + 1 cannot be excessive when the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution Uct+1=Uct is
decreasing in ct+1. Hence, the complementarity eect cannot dominate the wealth eect of sav-
ing. The proof replaces the well-known Jensen's inequality argument by a more general result
on the positive covariance of two monotonic functions of a random variable; see the proof of
Proposition 2 in Appendix A for details.
In addition to monotonicity of the agent's marginal rate of intertemporal substitution,
Proposition 2 assumes that the contribution of ct and ct+1 to the agent's life-time utility
U(c1; : : : ; cT ) depends only on information known until period t + 1. This assumption is a
strong one. It is obviously satised in the penultimate period in any setup with a nite time-
horizon. Hence we have the following result.
Corollary. Consider a history T 1 that occurs with positive probability and suppose that
cT (
T 1; T ) is not constant for almost all T . If UcT =UcT 1 is decreasing in cT , then 
K
T 1 > 0.
The corollary states that intertemporal wedges are positive at the end of the agent's working
life for very general models of time-nonseparable preferences. Finally, we note that the mea-
surability assumption of Proposition 2 is also satised when consumption is fully insured from
period t+2 onwards. In other cases, however, the link between life-time utility and consumption
at a given point in time depends potentially on the entire life-time consumption path, so that
Uct+1 is typically not 
t+1-measurable for time-nonseparable preferences.
5 Quantitative evaluation of a habit formation economy
As the previous analysis has shown, the sign of the optimal distortion on savings remains
theoretically ambiguous for time-nonseparable preferences apart from special cases analyzed
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in Proposition 2. It is therefore a quantitative question whether savings should be taxed or
subsidized, and how large those taxes or subsidies should be.
For the quantitative analysis, we focus on preferences where time-nonseparability is due
to habit formation. This case seems particularly relevant for capital taxation, because habit
formation has helped explain savings behavior under uncertainty in several macroeconomic
models as the survey by Messinis (1999) shows. Moreover, Heaton (1995) provides empirical
evidence for intertemporal substitutability of consumption at short time-horizons, with habit
formation occurring over periods of one year or longer. Given that the period for personal
taxation in the U.S. (and most other countries) is one year, these ndings suggest that habit
formation is the empirically most relevant case of time-nonseparability when it comes to optimal
taxation.
Our quantitative model captures some key features of the U.S. economy. In particular, the
skill process matches the empirical life-cycle prole and the cross-sectional variance of wages.
Given that the time-nonseparability of preferences already introduces an additional continuous
state variable, we assume for tractability reasons that the distribution of skills is independent
across time. As a robustness check, we allow the cross-sectional variance of skills to depend on
age in Section 5.4. Even though skill uctuations remain transitory in that environment, we pick
up one important aspect of persistent processes that is visible in the data: the cross-sectional
variance of log-wages increases with age (Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante, 2012).
5.1 Recursive formulation
We use a recursive approach to compute optimal allocations. In our setup optimal allocations
can be written recursively using only two state variables: promised utility and the agent's habit
level.
Let T < 1 and suppose that the distribution of skills is independent (but not necessarily
identical) across time. As usual, we suppose that the distribution is independent and identical
across agents. In period t = 1; : : : ; T , skill  has the time-dependent probability weight t(),
with
P
2 t() = 1, where  is a nite set of positive real numbers. Set the gross interest
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rate to Rt = R  1 for all t. Moreover, suppose agents' preferences are given as
U

fctgTt=1

 V

fltgTt=1

=
TX
t=1
t 1 (u(ct; ht)  v(lt)) ; ht = H(ct 1; ht 1); h1 given; (17)
where 0 <  < 1 is the agent's discount factor, u : R2+ ! R is a continuous, concave function
that is increasing in its rst argument, and v : R+ ! R is continuous, increasing and weakly
convex. Consumption utility u(ct; ht) is a function of current consumption ct and a history-
dependent reference level ht. The reference level ht is obtained iteratively using last period's
consumption and last period's reference level using the continuous function H : R2+ ! R+. As
usual, we suppose that the implied specication of life-time consumption utility increases in ct
for all t.
To obtain a problem that is amenable to numerical methods, we require compact spaces for
consumption and output. We therefore work with a consumption space of the form [c; c] and
an output space of the type [y; y]. We dene domt(h) to be the set of continuation utilities U
with the property that, given time-t reference level ht = h, there exists an incentive compatible
continuation allocation (cs; ys)s=t;:::;T which satises c  cs  c and y  ys  y for all T  s  t
and generates continuation utility
E
"
TX
s=t
t 1 (u(cs; hs)  v(ys=s))
#
= U; where ht = h; hs = H(cs 1; hs 1) for s > t: (18)
Given the structure of our problem, we can express domt(h) in closed form.
Lemma 2. For any h 2 R+ and 1  t  T , the set domt(h) is a compact interval with bounds
max(domt(h)) =
TX
s=t
s 1
 
u(c; hs) 
X
2
s()v(y=)
!
; with ht = h; hs = H(c; hs 1) for s > t;
min(domt(h)) =
TX
s=t
s 1
 
u(c; hs) 
X
2
s()v(y=)
!
; with ht = h; hs = H(c; hs 1) for s > t:
Given an initial reference level h1 and ex-ante utility U1 2 dom1(h1), we dene the value of
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the planner's cost minimization problem as:
C1(U1; h1) := min
c;y
E
"
TX
t=1
ct   yt
Rt 1
#
(19)
s.t.
E
"
TX
t=1
t 1 (u(ct; ht)  v(yt=t))
#
 E
"
TX
t=1
t 1 (u(ct(); ht()))  v(yt()=t))
#
8 2 
E
"
TX
t=1
t 1 (u(ct; ht)  v(yt=t))
#
= U1
c  ct  c 8t; y  yt  y 8t; ht = H(ct 1; ht 1) 8t > 1; h1 given.
By extending standard recursive techniques to the present problem, the planner's cost func-
tion C1 can be obtained recursively using the following functional equation for all t (using the
convention CT+1 = 0):
Ct(U; h) = min
c;y;U 0
X
2
t()

c()  y() + 1
R
Ct+1(U
0();H(c(); h))

(20)
s.t.
u(c(); h)  v(y()=) + U 0()  u(c(0); h)  v(y(0)=) + U 0(0) 8; 0X
2
t()

u(c(); h)  v(y()=) + U 0() = U
U 0() 2 domt(H(c(); h)) 8
c  c()  c; y  y()  y 8
Compared to the recursive formulation of incentive problems with time-separable preferences
by Spear and Srivastava (1987) and Phelan and Townsend (1991), time-nonseparability adds
the agent's reference level h as a second state variable to the planner's problem. Clearly, the
state variable in the time-separable case (promised utility) is no longer sucient here, because
the planner faces heterogeneous types of agents when preferences are time-nonseparable. On
the other hand, no additional states other than the agent's current reference level h are needed,
because the agent's type is fully determined by observable information, which allows to separate
the incentive constraint into a sequence of temporary incentive constraints similar to the time-
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separable case.
The recursive formulation in equation (20) reaches beyond the case of Cobb-Douglas habit
formation studied below. For instance, it includes the case of linear habit formation, u(ct; hh) =
~u(ct ht), explored by Constantinides (1990) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999). The formu-
lation also includes the case of durable goods (intertemporal substitutability of consumption)
if we set u(ct; hh) = ~u(ct + ht) and interpret ct as the current expenditure on a durable good
and ht as the previous stock of the durable good.
The previous insights give rise to a simple computational approach. We rst solve for the
sequence of domain restrictions (domt(h))h2R+;t=1;:::;T following Lemma 2. We then exploit the
functional equation (20) to obtain the sequence of cost functions (Ct)t=1;:::;T of the planner's
problem using standard numerical optimization procedures. The associated policy functions are
then iterated forward to generate the optimal allocation.
5.2 Parameters
There are T = 10 periods with a duration of 5 years each. Agents enter the model at age 18.
In each period, skill t is randomly drawn from the set ftL; tHg, where both realizations have
equal probability and tL < tH . Draws are independent across agents and time. We choose the
life-cycle prole of expected skills in line with Hansen (1993, Table II), who estimates relative
eciency proles of workers in the United States over the years 1955 to 1988.9 Fitting those
proles to 5-year intervals generates the numbers in Table 1. Skills are hump-shaped over
the life-cycle and peak in period 7 (age 48). Regarding the variance of skills, we target the
cross-sectional variance of log-wages in the United States in the period 1967{2006 (Heathcote,
Storesletten, and Violante, 2012, Table 3), which leads to a variance of log-skills of 0:351.
Table 1: Life-cycle prole of expected skills
E[1] E[2] E[3] E[4] E[5] E[6] E[7] E[8] E[9] E[10]
0.560 0.754 0.912 1.034 1.119 1.168 1.180 1.156 1.095 0.999
Our preference specication follows Abel (1990), Carroll, Overland, and Weil (2000), and
9Hansen (1993) uses average hourly earnings of a given age-subgroup divided by average hourly earnings of
all subgroups as the relative eciency measure.
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Diaz, Pijoan-Mas, and Rios-Rull (2003), and sets up habit formation in a Cobb-Douglas form:
u(ct; ht) = ~u

cth
 
t

= ~u

c1 t

ct
ht

; (21)
where  is a number between zero and one. Note that period utility depends on a Cobb-
Douglas aggregate of absolute consumption, ct, and absolute consumption relative to the habit
level, ct=ht, and the parameter  controls the relative importance of these two components.
10 In
line with Diaz, Pijoan-Mas, and Rios-Rull (2003), we choose  = 0:75. This value corresponds
to the case of `strong habits' explored by Carroll, Overland, and Weil (2000) and is reasonably
close to empirical results by Fuhrer (2000), who estimates a value of 0.80 based on aggregate
consumption data. Period utility is of the CRRA type: ~u(x) = x1 =(1   ). We set  = 3
in line with recent estimations by Paravisini, Rappoport, and Ravina (2010). The discount
factor is  = 0:985 and the interest rate equals R = 1=. The labor disutility function is
v(l) = l
1+ 1
 =(1 + 1 ), with a Frisch elasticity of labor supply of  = 0:5, and  = 1.
The habit process in our model has a persistence coecient of  and is given by:
ht = (1  )ct 1 + ht 1: (22)
Diaz, Pijoan-Mas, and Rios-Rull (2003) set  to 0:75 for yearly periods. Carroll, Overland, and
Weil (2000) explore a continuous time model in which habits adjust to permanent changes in
consumption with a half-life of 3.5 years. Adapted to 5-year periods, both approaches imply
very similar coecients and we therefore choose  = 0:755 as our baseline case.11
We set the initial habit level to h1 = 0:7. As we verify ex-post, this number coincides
approximately with the agent's consumption level in the rst period. We set the initial utility
promise U1 such that the planner's budget is balanced, i.e., C1(U1; h1) = 0. We verify that the
bounds c, c, y, and y are never binding for the optimal allocation starting from this initial state.
10Another common specication of habit formation is the linear one: u(ct; ht) = ~u (ct   ht); see Constantinides
(1990) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999). For our present purposes, the Cobb-Douglas formulation is more
convenient, since period utilities are well dened whenever ct and ht are positive. The linear formulation has the
drawback of ruling out all pairs (ct; ht) with ct < ht, which makes the computation of the domain restriction
and of the optimal allocation somewhat more cumbersome.
11The available empirical evidence on the persistence of habits is mixed. Depending on the environment, some
studies nd persistence levels close to zero (Fuhrer, 2000), while other estimations point to signicantly larger
values (Heaton, 1995). We provide a case with non-persistent habits ( = 0) and a case with high persistence
( = 0:5) as robustness checks.
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Figure 1: Expected consumption and output over the life-cycle
5.3 Results
Figure 1a presents the paths of expected output and consumption for our baseline case ( = 0:75,
 = 0:24, h1 = 0:7). Expected output follows the hump-shaped pattern of the skill process.
Expected consumption increases over the life-cycle and grows by about 60 percent from age 18
to age 63. Figure 1b shows the corresponding paths for the case of time-separable preferences
( = 0).12 The path of expected output is very similar to the habit formation case. Expected
consumption, however, is virtually at (but slightly monotonically decreasing) for time-separable
preferences. This shows that habit formation has a positive impact on the optimal growth rate
of consumption.
Figure 2a decomposes expected intertemporal wedges into the wealth eect, complementarity
eect, and future incentive eect. The expected intertemporal wedge is virtually zero|apart
from the very end of the agent's working life. The wealth eect and complementarity eect are
positive in all periods, as shown by equations (7) and (8) in Proposition 1. As expected, the
future incentive eect is negative. In line with Lemma 1, the future incentive eect is zero in
the penultimate period, because there is no incentive problem more than one period ahead.
The quantitative impact of habit formation is sizable (Figure 2b). The life-cycle average of
the intertemporal wedge with habit formation is 0.024 (corresponding to a 24.8 percent tax on
12To make the allocations comparable, we choose a scaling parameter of  = 3:75 for the time-separable case,
such that the discounted value of life-time output (and consumption) coincides with the habit formation case.
This adjustment has a negligible eect on intertemporal wedges: averaged over the life-cycle, wedges are 0.0393
for  = 1 and 0.0390 for  = 3:75.
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Figure 2: Expected intertemporal wedges over the life-cycle
net interest R   1). In the time-separable case it is 0.039 (corresponding to a 40.6 percent tax
on net interest). The dierence is even more pronounced if we focus on workers aged between
18 and 53. For those workers, the average wedge with habit formation is only one ninth of the
average wedge with time-separable preferences. Habit formation also changes the qualitative
features of intertemporal wedges: the increase of intertemporal wedges towards the end of the
working life is much steeper with habit formation.
In our results, the future incentive eect dominates the complementarity eect by a large
margin. Intuitively, the future incentive eect encourages saving (and thus next period's con-
sumption) in order to relax incentive problems in the later future. The complementarity eect,
by contrast, discourages saving in order to relax the incentive problem in the immediately fol-
lowing period. There are two reasons why the future incentive eect is more signicant than
the complementarity eect. First, towards the end of the working life, incentive provision must
rely less on future promises and more on costly immediate consumption rewards. This makes
relaxing future incentive problems important. Second, mean skills increase until age 48 and
are relatively at thereafter. Therefore, eort from younger workers contributes less to social
output, and thus incentive provision in early periods is less crucial. For these two reasons,
the future incentive eect dominates the complementarity eect (except at the very end of the
working life).
The heterogeneity of intertemporal wedges is analyzed in Figure 3. For each period, we
display minimum and maximum intertemporal wedges among all possible histories. We see
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that intertemporal wedges are indistinguishable from zero until age 48, ambiguous at age 53,
and clearly positive at age 58.
For habit formation as well as time-separable preferences, expected intertemporal wedges
increase steeply towards the end of the agent's life. As argued before, incentives are provided
more by immediate consumption rewards and less by future promises as the agent approaches
the nal periods. Hence, the negative impact of saving on next period's incentive problem
becomes stronger over time, and this increases the wealth eect; compare Golosov, Troshkin,
and Tsyvinski (2011). For the habit formation model, this also increases the complementarity
eect. Moreover, the future incentive eect reaches zero in the penultimate period, which
additionally boosts the intertemporal wedge in that period.
For the case of time-separable preferences, the quantitative exploration closest to ours is by
Albanesi and Sleet (2006). Based on an innite horizon model with independently identically
distributed skills, they nd intertemporal wedges of typically less than one percent. The closest
counterpart in our nite horizon setup is arguably the intertemporal wedge in the initial period.
For the time-separable case, we obtain an intertemporal wedge of 0.002 in the initial period,
which is in the same range as the wedges in Albanesi and Sleet (2006). The agent's time-
discount factor is almost identical to our setup, so the implied tax rates on capital returns are
also similar.
Farhi and Werning (2013) study optimal dynamic taxes in a life-cycle framework with time-
separable preferences and a persistent skill process. Averaged over the life-cycle, they nd
intertemporal wedges corresponding to a tax on net interest of about 10 percent, which is
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smaller than the number in our time-separable case. Much of this dierence is due to the lower
coecient of risk aversion in their framework. Indeed, for time-separable logarithmic utility,
our model generates intertemporal wedges that correspond to an average tax on net interest of
11.4 percent.
5.4 Sensitivity analysis
To study the sensitivity of our results, we explore alternative parameters for the persistence
of the habit process ( = 0;  = 0:5), the coecient of risk aversion ( = 2,  = 4), and the
initial habit level (h1 = 0:5, h1 = 1:5). We also explore a case in which the variance of the skill
process increases over the life-cycle. All our results are qualitatively robust to these changes.
For further details, we refer the reader to Appendix B.
The sensitivity analysis reveals how the future incentive eect depends on the preference
specication and the details of the incentive problem. If habits are non-persistent ( = 0), then
next period's consumption fully determines the habit level in the period thereafter. The motive
to encourage saving in order to increase consumption in the next period and thereby relax the
incentive problem in the period thereafter is then strong. As a result, the future incentive
eect becomes bigger in absolute value. When habits are persistent, the eect of next period's
consumption on habits in the period thereafter is mitigated. At the same time, the impact of
next period's consumption on habits in later periods becomes stronger. While the rst eect
decreases the future incentive eect, the second one increases it. In the extreme case of fully
persistent habits, consumption in any period becomes irrelevant for future habits and Lemma
1 implies that the future incentive eect is zero. The sensitivity analysis shows more generally
that the future incentive eect falls with the degree of persistence already at moderate ranges
of persistence. Finally, we note that the future incentive eect becomes more pronounced if
the variance of the skill process increases over time, because future incentive problems become
more important relative to immediate ones.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper studies optimal capital taxation in a model with private information and time-
nonseparable preferences. We characterize optimal allocations in terms of intertemporal wedges
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and decompose intertemporal wedges into three components. One component is the standard
wealth eect known from the time-separable case. The two novel components are a comple-
mentarity eect and a future incentive eect. The former is due to complementarities (or
substitutabilities) of consumption between adjacent periods, while the latter eect captures
consequences on the more distant future. We discuss two examples where these additional ef-
fects reverse the standard optimal taxation logic and generate nonpositive intertemporal wedges
(capital subsidies). We then evaluate intertemporal wedges quantitatively for a habit forma-
tion economy. In this case, the complementarity eect contributes positively to intertemporal
wedges, whereas the future incentive eect is negative. However, the future incentive eect is
quantitatively more signicant, so that intertemporal wedges fall by about 40 percent compared
to the time-separable case.
In many strands of the literature, habit formation has successfully bridged the gap between
theory and evidence. Our quantitative results suggest that this might also be the case for
models of optimal taxation with private information. With time-separable preferences, pre-
dicted optimal tax rates on capital income can exceed observed tax rates by a considerable
margin (Golosov, Troshkin, and Tsyvinski, 2011; Abraham, Koehne, and Pavoni, 2012). Our
quantitative results show that habit formation substantially reduces the optimal tax rates on
capital.
Moreover, our quantitative framework can serve as a starting point for taxation problems
with alternative forms of time-nonseparability. Housing seems a particularly interesting case,
as housing is an asset and a durable consumption good at the same time. In addition, housing
typically accounts for the largest fraction of households' wealth. Studying the optimal taxation
of housing might shed light on the widely observed practice of treating housing wealth dierently
from other asset classes. Finally, the recursive approach proposed in this paper extends beyond
optimal taxation and applies to arbitrary private information problems with time-nonseparable
preferences.
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Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The intertemporal wedge between periods t and t+ 1 is equal to
Kt = 1 
Et[Uct ]Et
h
1
Uct+1
i
Rt Et[Uct+1 ]Et
h
1
Uct+1
i : (23)
Equivalently, we have
Kt =
Rt Et[Uct+1 ]Et
h
1
Uct+1
i
  Et[Uct ]Et
h
1
Uct+1
i
Rt Et[Uct+1 ]Et
h
1
Uct+1
i : (24)
After adding and subtracting a few terms, we obtain
Kt =
Rt Et[Uct+1 ]Et
h
1
Uct+1
i
 Rt + Et
h
Uct
Uct+1
i
  Et[Uct ]Et
h
1
Uct+1
i
+Rt   Et
h
Uct
Uct+1
i
Rt Et[Uct+1 ]Et
h
1
Uct+1
i : (25)
By the denition of a covariance, we have
covt

Uct+1 ;
1
Uct+1

= 1  Et[Uct+1 ]Et

1
Uct+1

; (26)
covt

Uct ;
1
Uct+1

= Et

Uct
Uct+1

  Et[Uct ]Et

1
Uct+1

: (27)
This implies
Kt =
 Rt covt

Uct+1 ;
1
Uct+1

Rt Et[Uct+1 ]Et
h
1
Uct+1
i + covt

Uct ;
1
Uct+1

Rt Et[Uct+1 ]Et
h
1
Uct+1
i + Rt   Et
h
Uct
Uct+1
i
Rt Et[Uct+1 ]Et
h
1
Uct+1
i (28)
= t(At +Bt + Ct); (29)
where t =

RtEt[Uct+1 ]Et
h
1
Uct+1
i 1
is positive, since Uct+1 > 0.
Since the function x 7! 1=x is decreasing, the covariance term in At is nonpositive, which
renders At nonnegative. To verify that Bt can be zero, positive, or negative, rst note that
by concavity 1=Uct+1 is an increasing function of ct+1. Marginal utility Uct can be increasing
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or decreasing in ct+1, depending on whether consumption goods ct and ct+1 are complements
or substitutes. Hence, the covariance term in Bt can have a positive, negative or neutral sign.
Finally, to analyze the sign of Ct, observe rst that for time-separable preferences Ct is zero
by the Inverse Euler equation from Rogerson (1985). A case with a negative Ct is presented in
Example 2. To obtain a case in which Ct is positive, we simply change the preferences in that
example to U(c0; c1; c2) = u(c0) + u(c1) + u(c2   c0).
Proof of Lemma 1. Fix some history t that occurs with positive probability. Consider a per-
turbation that increases consumption at time t by  and reduces consumption at time t+ 1 by
. Then, depending on future shocks (t+1; : : : ; T ), the agent's consumption utility changes by
U = U
 
c1
 
1

; : : : ; cT
 
T
  U  c1  1 ; : : : ; ct  t  ; ct+1  t+1+ ; : : : ; cT  T  (30)
=
Z ct(t)
ct(t)+
Uct
 
c1
 
1

; : : : ; ; ct+1
 
t+1

; : : : ; cT
 
T

d (31)
+
Z ct+1(t+1)
ct+1(t+1)+
Uct+1
 
c1
 
1

; : : : ; ct
 
t

+ ; ; : : : ; cT
 
T

d: (32)
Since Uct and Uct+1 are by assumption 
t+1-measurable, the above formula shows that U
depends on (t+1; : : : ; T ) only through the variable t+1. Hence we can nd numbers  =
(; t+1) depending only on  and t+1 so that we have U = 0 for all (t+1; : : : ; T ). The
consumption perturbation is then neutral with respect to the incentive constraint.
The allocation (c;y) can only be optimal if the perturbed consumption scheme requires at
least as many resources as the original scheme c. Hence,  = 0 must minimize
   Et [(; t+1)]
Rt
; (33)
which yields the rst-order condition
1 
Et
h
Uct (c1;:::;cT )
Uct+1(c1;:::;cT )
i
Rt
= 0: (34)
Using the notation from Proposition 1, this implies Ct = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. Fix some history t that occurs with positive probability. Lemma 1
implies Ct = 0. By Proposition 1, the intertemporal wedge is therefore nonnegative if and only
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if
 Rt covt

Uct+1 ;
1
Uct+1

+ covt

Uct ;
1
Uct+1

 0: (35)
Using again the result Rt = Et

Uct=Uct+1

from Lemma 1 and dividing by Et

1=Uct+1

> 0, the
previous line is equivalent to the condition
 Et [Uct ] +RtEt

Uct+1
  0: (36)
Since Rt = Et

Uct=Uct+1

, we can rewrite the previous line as
covt

 Uct+1 ;
Uct
Uct+1

 0: (37)
Concavity of the utility function U implies that the negated marginal utility  Uct+1 is increasing
in ct+1. In addition, Uct=Uct+1 is increasing in ct+1 by assumption. Since the covariance of two
increasing functions of a random variable is nonnegative (Schmidt, 2003), we have established
the rst part of the proposition. The second part follows from the fact that the covariance of
two increasing functions of a random variable is positive unless the random variable is constant
almost everywhere.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let ~U(c; y) be the time-t continuation utility of an agent with reference
level ht = h who consumes a xed level c
 and produces a xed output y in periods t; : : : ; T
irrespective of his skill. Clearly all such allocations are incentive compatible. Setting hs =
H(c; hs 1) for s > t, we have
~U(c; y) =
TX
s=t
s 1
 
u(c; hs) 
X
2
s()v(y=)
!
(38)
and it is obvious that no other incentive compatible allocation can deliver a higher continuation
utility. Similarly, using hs = H(c; hs 1) for s > t, we have
~U(c; y) =
TX
s=t
s 1
 
u(c; hs) 
X
2
s()v(y=)
!
(39)
and no other incentive compatible allocation can deliver a lower continuation utility.
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To verify that domt(h) is an interval, note that domt(h) contains all numbers that can be
written as ~U(c; y) for some c 2 [c; c], y 2 [y; y]. By the continuity of ~U (ensured by the
continuity of u; v;H) this covers all numbers in the interval [ ~U(c; y); ~U(c; y)]. Hence, we have
domt(h)  [ ~U(c; y); ~U(c; y)]: (40)
On the other hand, we clearly have
domt(h)  [min(domt(h)); max(domt(h))]: (41)
Using the results min(domt(h)) = ~U(c; y) and max(domt(h)) = ~U(c; y) from the rst step, the
two set inequalities taken together imply
domt(h) = [ ~U(c; y); ~U(c; y)]: (42)
This completes the proof.
B Sensitivity analysis
We rst study the role of the persistence parameter of the habit process. Figures 4a, 4b, and 4c
compare expected intertemporal wedges for the baseline case ( = 0:24), non-persistent habits
( = 0) and highly persistent habits ( = 0:5). We then consider a case in which the variance
of the skill process increases over time (Figure 4d). Skills have the same expected values as
in the baseline case, but their variance is age-dependent in line with ndings by Heathcote,
Storesletten, and Violante (2012, Figure 1A). Figures 4e and 4f explore low ( = 2) and high
( = 4) values for the coecient of relative risk aversion. Finally, we explore alternative values
for the initial habit level. The eect on intertemporal wedges is negligible and we therefore omit
the results for the sake of brevity.
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(a)  = 0:24 (baseline)
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(c)  = 0:5
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(d) age-dependent skill variance
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(e)  = 2
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(f)  = 4
Figure 4: Decomposition of expected intertemporal wedges for alternative persistence param-
eters (a,b,c), skill process with age-dependent variance (d), and alternative coecients of risk
aversion (e,f)
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